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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In a recent survey, The Economist argues that talent has become the world’s most 
sought-after commodity. The greying of populations and the retirement of the baby-
boom generation throughout the developed world, the increasing globalization and the 
shift towards ‘tacit’ jobs makes the shortage of young graduates a serious problem. 
No economy can afford to be complacent about the war for talent. Alongside the rapid 
progress of China and India with their huge pools of young talented people, greying 
Europe faces particular challenges if it does not want to struggle to find enough 
engineers, scientists, doctors, lawyers and managers.   
During the last decade Europe’s annual growth in GDP per capita has been about 0.4 
percentage points lower than in the US. If this continues for another decade, Europe’s 
GDP per capita relative to that of the US will fall back by a further quarter. Still, the 
investment rate and the capital-labour ratio are higher in Europe than in the US. 
Aghion (2006) therefore stresses that Europe’s problem is not insufficient saving and 
investment, but lack of competition, not enough R&D and too little investment in 
education. As secondary education was crucial to the post-war economy, so higher 
education has become essential for the development of the knowledge society, which 
demands increasing levels of supply of highly-educated, highly-skilled people. As 
Europe approaches the world technology possibility frontier, the returns on investing 
in higher education become even higher.  
European universities have enormous potential.  But European universities are not 
currently in a position to achieve their potential in a number of important ways. As a 
result, they are behind in the increased international competition for talented 
academics and students, and miss out on fast changing research agendas and teaching 
curricula, and on generating the critical mass, excellence and flexibility necessary to 
succeed. These failures are compounded by a combination of excessive public 
control, bad governance coupled with insufficient funding. Europe needs universities 
able to build on their own strengths and differentiate their activities on the basis of 
these strengths.   
Modernization of Europe’s universities, involving their interlinked roles of education, 
research and innovation, has therefore rightly been acknowledged not only as a core 
condition for the success of the broader Lisbon Strategy, but as part of the wider move 
towards an increasingly global and knowledge-based economy. Various policy 
communications have identified the main items for change
1.  At the informal meeting 
at Hampton Court in October 2005, R&D and universities were acknowledged as 
foundations of European competitiveness. Also, the 2006 Spring European Council 
agreed on stronger action at the European level to drive forward this agenda for 
universities and research, which should be implemented by the end of 2007 in the 
context of the renewed partnership for growth and employment. In the National 
                                                 
1E.g. ‘Mobilising the brainpower of Europe: enabling universities to make their full contribution to the 






Reform Programmes based on the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs, i.e., the 
renewed Lisbon Strategy, Member States refer generally to these issues.   
Nevertheless, few make them national priority. Yet these changes are crucial to 
regenerate Europe’s growth capacity.   
This paper will discuss the reforms needed to deal with the challenges ahead.   It will 
investigate which policy actions are needed and at which level, to unleash EU’s 
potential of its higher education system.  Within a subsidiarity perspective, we will 
focus particularly on what role the EU can have in reforming Higher Education in 
Europe, relative to Member States.  But first we start with characterizing the major 
challenges facing EU’s Higher Education. 
While the focus of our discussion is mostly on higher education, the interlinkages of 
education and research cannot be ignored. The main reason being that the universities, 
who are pivotal players in the higher education market, combine both activities.  
Section 2 discusses the facts and challenges of higher education facing Europe today. 
They concern rising enrolment rates, the rising private returns to education, the 
importance of access for pupils from less privileged backgrounds, governance 
problems and the substantial funding problems of institutions of higher education, 
lack of internationalisation and underperformance in research and teaching. Section 3 
puts forward our proposals for reform of higher education in Europe based on more 
autonomy for universities, higher tuition fees, more private funding, introduction of 
income-contingent loans, better governance, more competition among universities and 
a big leap forward in internationalisation. We argue that these reforms will help to 
address the challenges of European universities. Section 4 takes a subsidiarity 
perspective and asks what the role of the EU can be in reforming the Higher 
Education sector.  Compared to Member States, the EU provides the scope for 
creating an enlarged open market for higher education and a EU wide level playing 
field for universities. Apart from a sustained effort in providing mutual policy 
learning opportunities, cross recognition of qualifications and furthering the goals of 
the Bologna reforms, the EU should take a leading role in promoting mobility of 
students, researchers and teachers and opening up of national funding schemes for 
applications from other Member States. The EU should also take more initiatives in 
the context of the renewed Lisbon Strategy to fund research and education through the 
Structural Funds and the funds for ‘Competitiveness for Growth and Development’, 
invest in EU flagships and facilitate global cooperation. The EIB should be a crucial 
driver in the Higher Education market by making income-contingent loans available. 







2.  CHALLENGES OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN EUROPE 
The EU counts almost 4 000 higher education institutions (of which about 2000 are 
universities strictu sensu who combine education with basic research), over 17 million 
students and some 1.5 million staff - of whom 435,000 are researchers.   
This system of higher education and research in Europe today faces key challenges
2: 
2.1.  Increasing demand for higher education. 
The active population of the EU (25-64 years) has lower levels of higher education 
attainment than its main competitors in the global economy. The average level of 
higher education attainment among the active population in the EU is 21%, 
significantly lower than in the US (38%) and Japan (36%). Figure 1 gives the 
graduation rates for various OECD countries. 
Furthermore, in comparison with its most important competitors, higher education 
institutions in the EU attract a lower proportion of secondary school leavers, implying 
that higher education in Europe is still not an attractive option for a significant part of 
pupils having completed upper secondary education.  About 25% of young people 
aged 18-24 years were enrolled in higher education in EU 25 in 2002, a much lower 
share than in the USA (37.7%). In the USA, tertiary students start to study on average 
at an earlier age than in Europe. Almost 40% of 18-year-olds in the US participate in 
higher education, compared to about 15% in the EU  
However, the EU is catching up. Despite low birth rates in the 1980s, the number of 
higher education students in Europe is increasing as a result of a growth in enrolment 
rates. The number of higher education students increased in the EU in the period 1997 
to 2002 by 16% or on average by 3.1% per year, compared to an annual growth of 
2.2% in the USA and only 0.1% in Japan.  
Figure 1 shows the increase in tertiary graduation in most countries (between 2000 
and 2004).  But at the same time, it highlights the heterogeneity among tertiary 
graduation rates across countries, particularly within the EU. The Scandinavian 
countries and the UK reach the highest level of graduation rates while Germany, 
France, Austria attain the lowest levels.    
 
 
                                                 
2 Most of the data come from OECD (2006) Education at a Glance,  EU-Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Annex to the Communication from the Commission ‘Mobilising the brainpower of Europe: 
enabling universities to make their full contribution to the Lisbon Strategy’, 
European Higher Education in a Worldwide Perspective {COM(2005)152 final} and EC-RTD, Key 






Figure 1: Tertiary-type A Graduation rates (2000, 2004) 
 
Note:  A traditional university degree is associated with completion of ‘type A’ tertiary courses; ‘type 
B’ generally refers to shorter and often vocationally oriented courses.  The graph shows the number of 
students of any age completing tertiary-type A programmes for the first time, in 2000 and 2004, as a 
percentage of the age-group normally completing each level. 
While the EU produces more PhDs overall, it employs only 5.5 researchers per 1 000 
employees, which is much less than the US (9.0) and Japan (9.7). The rapid growth of 
Asian universities, both public and private, is now also challenging Europe – and the 
US – in terms of doctoral candidates in science and engineering
  (EC-RTD, Key 
Figures 2005). 
Demand for higher education is driven by the returns from education. Attaining 
higher levels of education can be viewed as an economic investment in which there 
are costs paid by the individual (including reductions in earnings while receiving 
education) that typically result in higher earnings over the individual’s lifetime. Not 
only do graduates experience relatively low unemployment rates and good 
employment prospects, they also enjoy a fast rising skill premium despite a massive 
increase in the number of graduates. Investment in higher education is thus becoming 
more and more lucrative. 
In this context, Figure 2 shows that the investment to obtain a university level degree, 
when undertaken as part of initial education, can produce private annual internal rates 
of returns as high as 22.6%, with all countries showing a rate of return above 8%. 
Costs of higher education (45 thousand euros) are much less than lifetime earnings, 






students will not be poor and can borrow more. Lifetime earnings in, for example, the 
Netherlands vary from 1.2 million euros for economics, medical, agriculture and 
technical university male graduates to 0.9 for behavioural and social graduates and 0.8 
million euros for arts male graduates (Jacobs, 2002). 
Figure 2: Private internal rates of return on obtaining a university-level degree 
from an upper-secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary level of education (2003)  
 
While on average, the returns from higher education are considerable, the graph also 
shows heterogeneity in returns among countries.  Countries differ significantly in the 
dispersion of earnings among individuals with similar levels of educational 
attainment. Also, as Table 1 indicates, graduate unemployment rates differ, with 
evidence that returns from higher education, in the form of expected employment 
rates, are lower in the EU. 
Table 1: Graduate unemployment rates in 2003 
  EU 25  USA  Japan 
Unemployment rate of population aged 25-64 
with tertiary education attainment 
4,2 3,0    3,9 
Unemployment rate of population aged 25-64 
with less than secondary education  
10,3 10,2  6,6 







2.2.  Improving access to higher education  
Access to higher education is highly dependent upon successful participation at earlier 
stages of education. Efforts to improve the quality of higher level education will 
clearly be in vain if standards at school level are deficient. Therefore upper-secondary 
completion rates and key competency levels at the end of lower-secondary education 
are important indicators of the degree to which pupils have been prepared and 
motivated for higher education after initial schooling.  Completion of upper-
secondary education is also increasingly important, not just for entry into the labour 
market, but also for the access it allows to higher education and for paving the way to 
participation in Lifelong Learning activities. This is why one of the five European 
benchmarks requires that, by 2010, 85% of 22-year-olds in the EU should have 
completed upper-secondary education. In 2004 the EU average was 76.4%, which is 
still lower than levels in the leading non-EU OECD countries. 
 
2.3.  Governance Problems in supplying higher education services 
European universities often are smaller than their counterparts in comparable OECD 
countries. To this smaller scale, increasing objectives are projected.  Policy-makers 
have been pushing universities to play a greater role as social actors, and to create 
‘social value added’ by extending their role in society.  From pure institutions of 
education they have evolved towards research institutions where new fields of science 
and technology are nurtured.  Universities are required not only to play an active role 
in education, absorbing the increasing mass of incoming students at bachelor level,  at 
the same time being asked to produce high quality basic research and turn this basic 
research into commercial applications.  University spin-offs and licensing university 
patents are instruments for commercialising publicly funded research, and attract a 
great deal of policy attention.  While in the EU about 2000 universities are also 
engaged in research and deliver postgraduate diplomas leading to Master and Ph.D. 
degrees, in the US, out of 4000 higher education institutions, only 500 deliver 
postgraduate education and only 150 universities are research universities. 
Beyond an often too small scale and insufficient focus, European universities suffer 
from bureaucracy and lack of autonomy. The over-regulation of university life hinders 
modernisation and efficiency. Ex ante control hinders universities’ capacity to react 
swiftly to changes in their environment and to engage in international competition.  
Many parameters are fixed: subsidies per student are fixed, tuition fees cannot be 
varied, the number of places for each course is often fixed by the ministry of 
education, and applicants cannot be refused once they have passed their national 
exams.  Nationally defined courses and employment rules for academic staff tend to 
inhibit curricular reform and interdisciplinarity. Inflexible admission and recognition 






While a number of EU countries have started off reforming their higher education 
sector (like Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK),  the governance of 
universities remains very centralized, state controlled in France, Greece and Italy, or 
at the level of regions (in Germany, Spain, Belgium).   
 
2.4.  Funding Problems 
Universities have to cope with a bewildering range of disparate tasks while being 
faced with increasing budgetary constraints. 
2.4.1.  Funding for Higher Education 
The EU-25 devotes a much lower share of its wealth to the financing of tertiary 
education than the US. In 2001, the EU spent 1.3% of its GDP on the financing of 
tertiary education compared to 3.3% in the US and 1.2% in Japan. 
Although public funding of tertiary education is also higher in the US than in the EU, 
the most striking difference between the two regions concerns private expenditure. In 
relative terms, private expenditure on higher education is nines times higher in the US 
than in the EU. Table 4 indicates that the difference between the EU and the US is 
less marked when one considers all levels of education.  
Within the EU, the Scandinavian countries have the highest share of tertiary spending 
in GDP (most of this spending being public). While Germany, France and the UK 
spend a bit more than 1%, Italy has an even lower share. Similar gaps show up in 
yearly spending per student.   While the EU is spending on average 8,600 euro per 
student, the US is spending on average 20,000 euro. For example, the Ivy League 
universities now charge more than 40.000 US dollars including board.  
This spending gap between the EU and its major international competitors can be 
correlated to the financing mode of higher education. In the EU most of the financing 
of higher education is public funding, where the State is seen as the provider of 
education services as public goods with  education being mostly ‘free’ with  low fees 
and low private funding through foundations and donations.  While in the EU private 
spending on higher education represents on average 0.1% of its GDP, this is 1.4% in 
the US (0.8% in the OECD). 
The percentage of funding for tertiary education coming from private sources varies 
widely across countries, from less than 4% in Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway to 
more than 50% in Australia, Japan and the United States, and even above 80% in 
Korea. In some countries, tertiary institutions are now relying more heavily on private 















In addition, the nature of public funding for education varies considerably across 
countries and time. Governments rely more and more on (lump-sum) ‘block grants’ 
with both output and input criteria. Most countries fund on the basis of inputs such as 
number of enrolled students (Australia, Belgium, France, and New Zealand). Funding 
in Denmark stresses output, since universities receive funding on number of grade 
points that students receive (the so-called ‘taxi-meter model’). The Netherlands and 
Sweden take intermediate positions. About half of funding in the Netherlands depends 
on the number of diplomas. A similar share of resources depends on number of grade 
points in Sweden. Germany and the UK differ as funds are allocated on historical 
grounds independently of the number of students or output criteria, but funding is 
based on negotiations and enrolment forecasts. However, the UK government puts a 







Figure 3: Types of public subsidies for higher education (2002) 
 
With respect to the types of funding (fees, grants, loans, sponsoring, etc.), Figure 3 
indicates that there exists large heterogeneity. No tuition fees exist in Denmark, 
Germany and Sweden.
3 Other countries have centrally determined tuition fees that 
may differ between various fields of study (Australia, France, Netherlands, and the 
UK). Typically, prices charged to students do not depend on costs. In recent years, 
governments (Australia, Belgium, France, Netherlands and UK) increased tuition 
rates to maintain resources per student in the face of increasing enrolment. This also 
happened in the US and New Zealand where institutions are free to set fees. Some 
countries (Belgium, Netherlands, UK) have decreased student grants and increased 
loan facilities. In contrast, Germany, Sweden and Denmark, have increased grants and 
loan facilities. France only increased grants. New Zealand and Australia both 
substantially increased loan facilities. Conditions governing student grants have 
become tighter by linking grants/loans to academic progress in Denmark, Germany, 
Netherlands, and Sweden.  
 
                                                 
3 However, Germany has just announced promising new reforms: up to ten new ‘elite’ universities will 
get an extra 100 million euro for research, greater autonomy for the Länder governments with respect 
to finance, appointment of professors, management, etc., possibility of introducing tuition fees in 9 of 






2.4.2.  Funding for Research at Universities 
Within the Lisbon Strategy, the Barcelona European Council recommended that 
spending on R&D in the EU should approach 3% of GDP by 2010 and that one third 
of that should come from the public sector. This also has implications for higher 
education funding since universities are expected to be beneficiaries of parts of the 
additional funding for R&D. 
R&D performed in the higher education sector is on the rise in Europe, Japan and the 
US. In 2003, higher education expenditure on R&D amounted to 0.44% of GDP in the 
EU as a whole, well above its 1997 level (0.38% of GDP). Within the EU, the three 
Nordic countries Sweden, Finland and Denmark showed the highest intensity of 
higher education R&D in 2003, with values above 0.60% GDP. Austria and the 
Netherlands were also above the EU average. On the other hand, most of the new 
Member States (except Lithuania and Estonia) were far below the EU average. In both 
the US and Japan, higher education expenditure on R&D amounted to 0.43% of GDP 
in 2003, compared to, respectively, 0.37% and 0.41% of GDP in 1997. 
Business support for R&D in the higher education sector is substantially higher in the 
EU (6.6%) than in either the US (4.5%) or Japan (2.6%). In 2002, the differences 
between Europe and its competitors in the levels of government R&D funded by the 
business sector were even wider. In Europe growth can only be witnessed in the level 
of higher education R&D financed by the business sector.  
 
2.5.  Underperformance in delivering quality education and research  
2.5.1.  Quality of University Education 
A signal of the difficulty of the university systems in the EU to deliver on their 
education mission, is the high dropout/failure rate as well as the longer duration of 
tertiary education. At present, too many enrolled students leave the European 
universities without an academic degree. According to OECD data survival rates in 
higher education in the 13 EU countries for which data was available amounted to 
only 66% in 2000, compared to an OECD average of 70% and a rate of 66% in the 
US, 79% in Korea and 94% in Japan.
4  The high survival rates in East Asia are also 
related to specific attitudes towards education.
5 Survival rates in Europe vary widely 
between countries with highest rates in Ireland (85%) and the UK (83%) and 
relatively low rates in Sweden (48%) and Italy (42%). 
A tendency to uniformity and egalitarianism in many national systems has ensured 
that the average quality of universities, while generally homogeneous, is 
                                                 
4 Survival rates are calculated on the basis of the number of graduates divided by the number of new 
entrants at the typical age of entrance. 
5 Education being among the most important values acknowledged by Asian families. This leads to an 
attitude favouring high private investment in education in terms of time and financial resources and a 






comparatively good – at least academically. But there are also deficiencies stemming 
from insufficient differentiation. Most universities tend to offer the same 
monodisciplinary programmes and traditional methods geared towards the same 
group of academically best-qualified learners. 
 
2.5.2.  Research Quality 
In terms of total number of scientific publications, the EU outperforms the US and 
Japan.  However, if one adjusts for population, European claimed leadership in 
publication disappears, as Table 3 suggests. 
 




Source:  Dosi et al (2006) 
 
Moreover, in science, together with the numbers of publications, at least equally 
important, are the originality and the impact of scientific output upon the relevant 
research communities. Two among the most used proxies of such an impact are 
articles’ citations and the shares in the top 1% of most cited publications.  The US is 
well ahead with respect to both indicators. In particular, controlling for population, 







In the second and third column of the same table, the output (i.e., number of 
publications, citations, and top 1% publications) per population indicator is 
decomposed into two components: a measure of scientific productivity of university 
researchers (i.e., output per university researcher) and an index for the intensity of 
university researchers on population. Table 3 clearly shows that US leadership is due 
to the quality of research published rather than due to the sheer number of researchers. 
 
In a different context, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) argue that countries with a large 
population may benefit from returns to scale and be more efficient in providing public 
goods and generate higher productivity. Within the context of the market for higher 
education and research, it is clear that in such countries the chances of a genius 
surfacing in research is larger than for a small country. This is why it is important to 
engender competition (as well as cooperation) on a European level between the top 
researchers and degree programmes.  However, the evidence so far fails to support 
that the number of top universities per million inhabitants is an increasing function of 
the size of the population (Thissen and Ederveen, 2006). However, historical   
empirical comparisons neglect the potential of upcoming countries with a huge 
population like China and India.  Given the intense competition to get into the top 
universities in China and India, one should not be surprised to see during the next few 
decades many more top universities in Asia. 
 
 
2.6.  Increasing international competition 
European higher education remains fragmented - between and even within countries - 
into medium or small clusters with different regulations and, naturally, different 
languages.   But European universities, when attracting students, faculty and funding,  
are increasingly being faced with an international competitive arena that becomes 
ever more agile.  
Students increasingly travel abroad in search of the best study and research 
opportunities. In 2003, 2.12 million people studying in OECD countries were foreign 
students,  i.e.  enrolled outside their country of origin. This represented an 11.5% 
increase in total foreign students’ intakes reported to the OECD since the previous 
year. In the UK 13% of students enrolled in higher education is foreign (on basis of 
country of residence or secondary education).  Most notably, Australia, France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States receive 70% of foreign students 
in OECD countries. Students from China, India and Southeast Asia comprise the 
largest numbers of foreign students from partner countries. 
This global competition bears out most markedly when international ranking of 
different institutions are being published in the press. The Times Higher Education 
ranking of the world’s top 200 universities, for instance, considers peer review, 
recruiter review, international faculty, international students, student/staff ratios and 
faculty citations scores. Interesting is that Table 4 indicates that 41 and 42 of the top 






Saxon system of education. Continental Europe (excluding Switzerland) only had 
three universities in the top fifty in 2005 and this has dropped to only two in 2006.  
Table 4 also gives a summary of country scores in the 2006 rankings. We see that, 
apart from the elitist Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris, 
no universities of continental Europe feature in the 2006 top 50. Heidelberg 
University was in the 2005 top 50, but dropped out of the 2006 top 50. Australia does 
again surprisingly well with six universities and the same can be said for New 
Zealand newcomer Auckland University. China with Beijing University, Tsing Hua 
University and Fudan University and the China University of Science and Technology 
and Nanjing University will rapidly catch up in the rankings. The same is true for 
Indian universities like the Indian Institutes of Technology, the Indian Institutes of 
Management and Jawaharlal Nehru University. Continental Europe has 48 
universities in the 2006 top 200 and especially the  Netherlands is catching up. Still, 
they need to do a lot better to keep up the competition with their US counterparts and 
the rise in the number of top institutes in China and India. 
 
Table 4: Number of universities per country in the THES 2006 top 50  
Top 50  2005  2006 
US 20  22 
UK 8  8 
Australia/New Zealand  6  7 
Asia excl. Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
4 4 
Hong Kong/Singapore  4  2.5 
Canada 3  2.5 
Switzerland 2  2 
France 2  2 
Germany 1  0 
Total 50  50 
 
3.  REFORMING HIGHER EDUCATION IN EUROPE 
The previous analysis has shown that the EU needs to improve access to higher 
education, increase higher education attainment levels, and increase total investment 
in higher education, both public, but even more private. European universities also 
need to catch up with the best universities in the Anglo-Saxon world. It is crucial to 
improve incentives and generate the funds to be able to compete globally.  European 
universities have much less financial resources per student than in the US, are not 
competing much with their counterparts at home and abroad and are focused too 






Funding higher education will become increasingly more challenging due to the 
relentless operation of Baumol’s cost disease
6. If the EU has to make an effort to 
bridge its funding gap on higher education, be it public or private, this can only be 
realized if at the same time the governance of the higher education system is tackled. 
This is necessary to increase the efficiency of spending by these organizations, 
thereby delivering results. To attract more funding, universities first need to convince 
stakeholders - governments, companies, tax payers and above all students – that 
existing resources are efficiently used and would produce added value for them. 
Higher funding cannot be justified without profound change. Providing for such 
change is the main justification and prime purpose for fresh investment. Given the 
prevalence of overlong study durations, high dropout rates and/or graduate 
unemployment in Europe, investing more in the current system could be perceived as 
unproductive or even counter-productive. Yet combined under-funding and system 
rigidities are so acute in some countries of the EU that they impede the reform process 
at universities, who are consequently trapped in a vicious circle.  
If Member States are to break this vicious circle, they need to combine more and 
better targeted funding simultaneously with reforms of the supply side, thus creating 
the necessary conditions to enable universities to improve their performance, to 
modernize themselves and become more competitive. This implies granting 
universities much more autonomy while at the same time demanding them to be more 
accountable for delivering results.  
  
3.1.  More performance-based funding 
Most existing funding schemes suffer from ‘ratchet effects’ arising from budgeting 
and accounting procedures. University governors do not pursue cost-effective 
policies, because the government cream skims or even penalises cost savings. 
Universities are not very aware of how much each programme costs. They do not use 
rational cost-based criteria and allow for various cross-subsidies. Clearly, European 
universities have a need for more performance-based funding. 
Both output and input funding have unintended side effects. Output funding has the 
unintended disadvantage that it induces grade inflation and reduces incentives to cut 
costs. Input funding does not induce grade inflation, stimulates efficiency, but leaves 
monopolistic practices in tact. One thus has to strike a tough trade-off between, on the 
one hand, avoiding grade inflation and inefficiently run universities, and, on the other 
hand, curbing monopolistic practices. Countries that rely on substantial output 
                                                 
6 Teaching and research basically need to be done by highly qualified people and is more difficult to be 
replaced by technology. Productivity growth in universities inevitably lags behind that in the 
manufacturing, so the cost and price of university education inevitably rise over time. This is Baumol’s 







funding therefore often have quality safeguarding committees or make use of external 
examiners. If there is a lot of uncertainty and efforts correlate little with performance, 
high-powered incentives become less attractive. 
Governments should strike the right balance between core, competitive and outcome-
based funding (underpinned by robust quality assurance) for higher education and 
university-based research. Competitive funding should be based on institutional 
evaluation systems and on diversified performance indicators with clearly defined 
targets and indicators supported by international benchmarking for both inputs and 
economic and societal outputs. Funding should be based on less malleable criteria. 
It is also important to ‘move the post’ every few years, to avoid researchers and 
institutions to focus too much on the measurable targets only.   More important, 
difficult to measure and unrewarded activities (e.g., pastoral care of students, 
refereeing articles or helping graduates to get a good job) may be crowded out by easy 
to measure activities (e.g., peer reviewed publications). 
 
3.2.  More concentration of funding on excellence 
Outstanding quality can only emerge from an across-the-board ‘culture of excellence’. 
Excellence is never a permanent achievement. It always needs to be challenged. It can 
exist in a few entire universities, but much more widely in individual faculties or 
teams within institutions or networks. This requires concentration of resources. 
 
3.3.  More private funding  
Free higher education does not by itself suffice to guarantee equal access and 
maximum enrolments. This casts the much debated issue of tuition fees in a fresh 
perspective, isolated from the discussion on access, which is better targeted through 
other instruments, such as income-contingent loans and scholarships (see section 3.4).  
The debate on social and private returns from higher education has highlighted its role 
as an investment, benefiting both the individual (through higher income and status) as 
well as society as a whole (through higher employment rates, lower social costs and 
later retirement). If social returns exceed private returns, education causes positive 
external effects to society and the government should support education. Estimating 
macro-economic production functions where total output is explained by human as 
well as physical capital, one obtains macro returns to education at the lower end of the 
estimated micro returns, suggesting there is no strong case for social returns to be 
substantially higher than private returns (cf., Blundell et. al., 1999). However, 
empirical findings suggest that private returns to higher education are substantial 






funding of higher education and in particular for asking students to pay higher tuition 
fees.
7 
How should fees be set?  
There is evidence that unobserved heterogeneity is at least as important as observable 
variations in attendance and inputs as class size and number of teaching assistants 
(e.g., Martins and Walker, 2006). Peer effects are important in higher education (e.g., 
Sacerdote, 2001; Willams and Zimmerman, 2003). Education is a ‘customer-input 
technology’, since students are both consumers and co-producers of education. 
Selecting and attracting the smartest students thus generates a positive feedback loop 
as it raises the quality and reputation of the institute and thus increases further 
demand. Having high-quality students improves academic excellence all round and 
makes it possible to attract much better employees/professors and funding from 
sponsors and the state.  
 
Without peer group or reputation effects, profit maximizing universities set prices to a 
mark-up on marginal cost. The mark-up should be particularly high for courses with 
low price elasticity of demand (e.g., courses followed by local students or courses for 
which not many substitutes exist). Most students go to their local university, perhaps 
as they prefer familiar surroundings. The optimal tuition fees are higher for such 
students, because their price elasticity of demand is lower. If peer group and 
reputation effects matter, tuition fees are higher for the less able or less motivated 
students and lower for the smart students (cf., Rothschild and White, 1995). Hence, 
universities should award scholarships or give discounts to the brightest students, 
especially if they come from less privileged backgrounds. By selling below cost, 
universities induce permanent excess demand for their courses and can thus select the 
smartest students and pursue excellence.  
 
Unfortunately, the European system with its sometimes not very helpful emphasis on 
equality, implicitly entails cross subsidies from the smart to the less able students. 
Europe thus still has a long way to go in this respect. Of course, the main problem 
with tuition fees in Europe is that they are set centrally and do not vary according to 
demand and supply or to meet the special needs of  universities. Typically, fees are 
too low and too undifferentiated, thus encouraging ‘fun seeking’ students and an 
enormous mismatch of students to courses. 
 
How to set government subsidies? 
A government that maximizes utilitarian social welfare (graduate utility minus tuition 
subsidies), has no access to non-distortionary taxes and does not have any merit 
                                                 
7 Canada is an interesting testing ground, since provinces levy different fees.  Evidence suggests that 
rising fees by about 2,000 dollar in the 1990’s reduced the probability of participation by persons aged 
17, 18 and 19 relative to trend by amount 2 %-points; nevertheless university participation increased 
dramatically during this period (Johnson and Rahman, 2005). Unfortunately, this interesting study did 






motives for intervening in higher education, would set subsidies equal to zero (Jacobs 
and van der Ploeg, 2006). The market outcome is efficient.  
However, the government may support merit studies that are of interest to society as a 
whole and will not be provided by the market, while generating public benefits 
(‘educational welfare’).  Subsidies should be optimally targeted to fields of study that 
have the largest social returns. Furthermore, subsidies should be targeted towards the 
students that appear to generate most social value. Subsidies should be directed 
towards studies with a large social value, not a large private value. The mere fact that 
for some disciplines the marginal benefits are mainly non-monetary is not a reason for 
government subsidies. That will lead to over-investment in those disciplines. Students 
will take account of immaterial benefits themselves.  
In general, public subsidy should be high for merit studies, zero for studies with only 
a market rate of return and negative for studies with rent seeking and signalling 
externalities. Clearly, subsidies should be low if the cost of public funds is high and 
high when the elasticity of student demand is low. It follows that, in contrast to 
current practice, subsidies should be differentiated by type of study and type of degree 
programme. 
Clearly, the government has insufficient information about the preferences of 
individual students and the supply of courses and may wish to use vouchers rather 
than subsidies to universities. By giving students personal vouchers, which they can 
use to pay for their courses, the government encourages students to ‘vote with their 
feet’. This fosters competition between universities. 
 
3.4.  Addressing accessibility through income-contingent loans 
Empirical research suggests that the ability of the student and long-run background 
factors (‘culture’, ‘family’, ‘environment’) are the most important determinants of 
enrolment in higher education. Increasing enrolment in higher education of children 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds requires therefore first and foremost 
intervention in basic and secondary education (de la Fuente, 2006). 
Universities should be accessible to all with sufficient academic capabilities.  But this 
does not imply that higher education should be free from charge, neither does it imply 
that all should pay the same price, or should pursue the same quality of education.  If 
the purpose of low fees is to guarantee access to universities, and not income equality, 
an income-contingent loan scheme is sufficient. From a lifetime perspective, the key 
problem of students is not poverty but insufficient access to credit markets. 
To tackle student poverty as a barrier to education and to avoid students taking 
disruptive part-time jobs, students should be allowed to borrow for fees and cost of 
living. As the Australian experience indicates, income-contingent loans (ICL) can 
overcome problems of capital market imperfections with risk-averse students (Jacobs 






if their incomes after graduation are high enough. ICL thus offer a combination of 
loans and social insurance. If income risks of graduates are pooled, fewer subsidies 
are needed to eliminate risk aversion. 
Commercial banks and insurers are unable to write contracts based on future incomes, 
but the government can enforce contracts through the tax authorities and verify earned 
incomes. By selection and tracking of student performance and denying funds to non-
performing students, the government can more easily eliminate the ‘rotten apples’. In 
principle ICL feature no subsidies. Also, interest subsidies should be avoided as this 
only encourages excessive study and financial arbitrage if necessary with the help of 
wealthy parents. However, the risks of default may be borne by society. 
Shifting from grants towards income-contingent loans and at the same time 
introducing selection at the gate of universities and afterwards are a more efficient 
and equitable use of scarce public funds. It can avoid subsidies going to the less 
diligent, less talented students from richer families rather than to the smartest students 
from poorer families. 
 
3.5.  More competition among universities  
In response to scarcer public budgets, a rationalization of the supply side of the higher 
education market has taken place.  The resulting increase in the scale of universities 
has however generated the danger of creating (local) public monopolies. In the 
Netherlands the enormous increases in scale and monopolistic practices have gone 
hand in hand with huge increases in overhead and capital expenditures leading to 
substantial falls in resources for teaching. Such monopolies reduce quality (‘grade 
inflation’), ignore demand of students and employers, and increase overhead costs.  
Monopolistic price setting drives up tuition fees and lowers quantity and quality of 
supply of education, especially if the price elasticity of demand is low.  
Barriers to enter the market for higher education should be lowered by abolishing 
historical funding and barring cross-subsidies that hinder fair competition. Both 
private and public universities are better able to compete if subsidies are allocated 
directly to students through vouchers/grants. Students can spend the vouchers on the 
institution and courses of their preference. A level playing field can open national 
markets to the international environment, especially if students can get student loans 
for study abroad and can spend their vouchers abroad.  
To make the higher education market more transparent, it helps if an independent 
authority publishes yearly performance criteria of universities. These criteria should 
cover dropout rates, average enrolment durations, average exam marks, student 
evaluations, quality of scientific publications, evaluations of independent scientific 







3.6.  Better internal governance of universities 
Universities will not become innovative and responsive to change unless they are 
given real autonomy and accountability. Member States should guide the university 
sector as a whole through a framework of general rules, policy objectives, funding 
mechanisms and incentives for education, research and innovation activities. In return 
for being freed from over-regulation and micro-management, universities should 
accept full institutional accountability to society at large for their results.  
In many countries this would mean a new approach to policy making, with less ex 
ante checks and greater ex post accountability of universities for quality, efficiency 
and the achievement of agreed objectives.  
For universities, this requires new internal governance systems based on strategic 
priorities and on professional management of human resources, investment and 
administrative procedures. Care must be taken not to base governance on the model 
used in commercial business enterprises. Governance should take account of the fact 
that universities consist of professionals. Too much external incentives can crowd out 
intrinsic motivation. Supervisory boards consisting of captains of industry have little 
affinity with university life and may well be counter-productive.  
A pivotal area of university management is personnel management.  Human resources 
are a core determinant of quality in higher education and research. Universities must 
therefore work to enhance their human potential, both qualitatively and quantitatively, 
by attracting, developing and keeping talent in the teaching/research career. 
Excellence can only emerge from a favourable professional environment based in 
particular on open, transparent and competitive procedures. Vacancies for professors 
and researchers should be advertised publicly, and internationally. Researchers should 
be treated as professionals from the early stages of their career. Mobility across 
national border and between university and industry should be nurtured. 
Compensation should reward quality and achievement in the performance of all tasks. 
 
4.  WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE EU? 
The agenda mapped out in section 3 is by now, in essence, fairly established in policy 
documents. Action is primarily needed from the public authority and universities, but 
the students will have to become much more critical and vote with their feet if they 
are unhappy with the degree programme being offered. On the side of public 
authorities, Member States (and not the EU) are primarily responsible for the 
organisation of their higher education. European higher education is and needs to 
remain in the future diverse with respect to languages, culture, systems and traditions, 
thus keeping policy competence in higher education mostly decentralized.  
But alongside the fundamental local, regional and national roots of universities, the 






the EU, take full account of the principle of subsidiarity, thus recognizing that the 
Commission is not a direct actor in the modernization of universities. Competence 
should only be shifted to the EU level if good arguments suggest that this will indeed 
improve welfare.    
There are advantages of scale and of organizing policy at the EU level. The 
Commission first can play a catalytic role by providing political impetus, policy 
learning and coordination opportunities and targeted interventions in support of 
reform and modernization at Member State level.  In addition, the European 
dimension offers the potential benefits of larger scale operation, greater diversity and 
intellectual richness of resources, plus opportunities for cooperation and competition 
between institutions in a European wide integrated Higher Education market.  A more 
EU integrated Higher Education market spurs competition between European 
universities and thus boosts quality of education and innovation in Europe.  
There is therefore a case for increased mobility of student studying in other Member 
States. This can be aided with special EU grants and loans and by standardization and 
harmonization of types of degrees. It is also desirable to have increased mobility of 
professors and especially young researchers, since this leads to exchange of 
information and ideas and will benefit the quality of research. Furthermore, 
competition for research funds at the EU level will lead to a higher quality of research 
projects.  
 
4.1.  Coordinate policy and provide mutual policy learning opportunities 
The Commission can support a new political impetus for reform via coordinated 
interaction with Member States through the open method of coordination, identifying 
and spreading best practice and supporting Member States in their search for more 
effective university regimes through voluntary cooperation. In particular, the peer 
learning clusters set up within the Education and Training 2010 work programme 
offer an effective means of exploring how the challenges facing EU universities can 
be met. By offering a forum for the exchange of best practice and for the 
identification of innovative solutions the EU level can offer genuine added value. This 
mutual learning can be supported by surveys and studies, whereby indicator analysis 
can help to measure performance in terms of funding and outputs.  
4.2.  Towards an internal market for HE in Europe  
An enlarged market for higher education is crucial in order to create more 
opportunities for citizen choice and mobility,  as well as to break national monopolies 
or tight oligopolies at local level. 
4.2.1.  Cross recognition and standardization  
Sufficient compatibility between the different national regulations is indispensable for 






competencies demands a minimum level of organization at the European level in the 
form of common references and basic standards.  
One area of standardization is quality assurance. Quality depends primarily on a 
‘culture of quality’ and on an internal quality assurance within universities, especially 
if the university is close to the knowledge frontier. But the accountability of 
universities to society also requires an external system of quality assurance. In Europe 
this should be done through a network of agencies - catering each for a country/region 
or a discipline/profession – agreeing on some basic criteria in order to facilitate the 
cross-recognition of quality seals throughout the EU. Europe’s universities need 
quality seals with international credibility. Obviously, this will facilitate international 
mobility of students and faculty. In particular, the EU should take the lead in 
evaluating mechanisms by which the quality of various types of degree programmes 
can be judged. Such Michelin guides for higher education are essential for a better 
match between students and courses and for students being able to judge the best 
place for them to go to. 
4.2.2.  Bologna reforms 
Work in the context of the Bologna process is bringing about a convergence in the 
structure and length of degree programmes towards the Anglo-Saxon degree system. 
The advantages of the Bologna reforms towards introducing system of Bachelor and 
Master degree programmes in Europe are: 
•  Reduce the risk of choosing the wrong study, encourages students to take more 
demanding studies and to finish their studies more quickly. The Bologna reforms 
allow students to wait in the presence of uncertainty with regards to their capacities, 
interests and job market circumstances.   
•  Stimulate students to combine different studies. Much of technological and 
economic progress in contemporary society occurs in the twilight zone between 
different disciplines.  
•  Engender competition between a larger number of shorter degree programmes. If 
students are unhappy with a particular degree programme, they will vote with their 
feet and go to another programme. The reforms boost international exchange and fuel 
competition. 
•  It makes the European system compatible with systems of higher education found 
in UK, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and much of Asia and 
Latin America. This enhanced transparency encourages European universities to 
compete on a global scale. 
 
A major effort should be made to implement the core Bologna reforms in all EU 
countries: comparable qualifications (short cycle, Bachelor, Master, Doctorate); 
flexible, modernized curricula at all levels which correspond to the needs of the 
labour market; and trustworthy quality assurance systems. This requires targeted 
incentives from the national authorities responsible in order to ensure proper take-up 
of the reforms rather than mere superficial compliance with the standards. Curricula 
in specific disciplines or professions should be renovated, drawing on comparisons 






process seems to act as a stamp of quality in the sense that programmes that have been 
restructured according to the Bologna guidelines have attracted more students, 
especially if they were the leader in their country (Cardosa et. al., 2006). 
 
4.2.3.  Mobility of students 
The Bologna reforms in themselves will not create the conditions for increased intra-
university mobility of students. Students, particulary bachelor students seem to have a 
strong preference for selecting higher education services in close geographic 
proximity to home (see Kelchtermans & Verboven (2006)). Students may thus need to 
be stimulated to go abroad.   In addition, national grants/loans should be fully portable 
within the EU.  
Of course, the EU already has about twenty years of experience with the ERASMUS 
programme for promoting students to spend three to twelve month a year at another 
university in the EU. Since the inception of this programme, more than 1.2 million 
students have participated in such exchange visits while remaining enrolled in their 
university at home (i.e., ‘credit’ mobility). Most of them went to the UK and Ireland 
(probably to do with the English language and the efficient course structure), but 
Spain, Germany and Italy are becoming increasingly popular. The number of students 
going abroad to study full-time at a foreign university (‘diploma’ mobility) is much 
smaller. Despite rapid increases in the number of students abroad, the total number 
abroad is still well below the European Commission’s target of 10%.  
Temporary exchange students from the old Member States mainly go for the cultural 
experience while those from the New Member States value academic quality and 
learning a foreign language.  Also students who take a full-time course abroad are 
much more motivated by the quality of education (Thisse and Ederveen, 2006). It 
therefore seems sensible to make more funds available especially for those students 
completing a full Bachelor, Master or Ph.D. degree at universities in other Member 
States, since these are the students that care most about the quality of higher education 
and may be the ones that spur competition among European universities. They are 
also the ones that are more likely to work and stay abroad after migration (Oosterbeek 
and Webbink, 2006).  
If fees are low and the host country puts up most of the cost of university education 
(as is the case in most of Continental Europe), there is a possibility of free riding and 
thus a case for action at the EU level. As mobility increases, it also increases the 
incentive of universities to raise tuition fees for foreign students. If these students 
come from the EU, this can only be done by raising fees for home students as well. 
4.2.4.  Mobility of researchers/teachers 
The recent Directive on the recognition of professional qualifications
8 has made it 
simpler and quicker to have qualifications for professional practice recognized across 
                                                 






national borders. Procedures for academic recognition should also be reviewed to 
ensure quicker and more predictable outcomes (in particular, by publishing 
universities’ recognition policies). Full portability of pension rights coupled with the 
removal of other obstacles to professional, international or inter-sectoral mobility is 
needed to foster staff and researcher mobility.  
But perhaps the most important endeavour to increase staff mobility is to increase the 
attractiveness of the EU Higher Education Area. In March 2005 the European 
Commission adopted a European Charter for researchers and a code of conduct for the 
recruitment of researchers that aims at increasing the attractiveness of research careers 
and improve mobility and working conditions of researchers across Europe.
9 
4.2.5.  Opening up of national funding schemes 
Beyond mobility of students and staff,  mobility of funds can also contribute to 
improving the internal market for HE.  If Member States would open up their funding 
schemes to other EU or non-Europeans, this would give the opportunity to leverage 
the efficiency of their funding by drawing on capacities beyond geographic borders. It 
would enhance competition for funds and thus generate better quality.    
 
4.3.  Provide funding 
The Commission should urge national decision makers in all ministries to 
acknowledge that closing the severe funding deficit in higher education is a core 
condition for achieving the Lisbon Strategy. However, the mix of public and private 
funding and the mix of basic, competitive and output-related funding will remain 
different between countries to reflect the diversity of cultures, economies and 
university traditions within Europe.  
The funding available directly at the EU level for education and research at 
universities is negligible compared to funding from Member States.  Nevertheless,  it 
can play a catalyzing role for enhancing the use of national resources and stimulating 
the quality of higher education in the EU.  The mechanisms within the Financial 
Perspectives 2007-2013 include not only the Funds for “Competitiveness for Growth 
& Employment” programmes (the 7
th EU Framework Programme for R&D, Lifelong 
Learning Programmes & Erasmus, Competitiveness and Innovation Programme), but 
also the Structural & Cohesion Funds.  And also the EIB can provide an important 
financial impetus for higher education in Europe.  
                                                 
9 Commission Recommendation of 11 March 2005 on the European Charter for Researchers and on a 







4.3.1.  Structural Funds 
Structural and rural development funds offer possibilities to stimulate the 
modernization of higher education via sectoral measures.  These possibilities should 
be fully developed, since they represent the bulk of funding available at EU level. 
10 
The Structural Funds can provide funding for the improvement of universities’ 
facilities and resources, the fostering of partnerships between the academic and 
business communities and the support of research and innovation relevant to regional 
or Member State economic development objectives. The Structural Funds’ system of 
decentralised management enables regional specificities to be taken into account. 
Member States, regional authorities and universities should take full advantage of 
these opportunities to improve synergies between education, research and innovation, 
particularly in the EU's less economically developed Member States and regions.  
4.3.2.  Funds for "Competitiveness for Growth & Employment" (FP, CIP, 
LLL&Erasmus) 
A considerable part of overall student mobility within Europe is supported through 
Community programmes such as Erasmus, which has funded more than one million 
students since its inception in 1987/88. The next phase of the scheme (2007-2011) has 
the ambitious target of three million students to have studied abroad with an Erasmus 
grant by 2011. This implies that 375,000 students will be participating in the final 
year of the programme.  
Funding students through direct scholarships, like Erasmus, should increase in 
importance. These scholarships should be extended to fund “diploma mobility” and to 
enable graduates to follow Master and Ph.D. degrees in other Member States as well. 
The Marie Curie funds offered for international mobility of post-docs and other 
academics should be increased.  But just as important is a drastically reduction in the 
bureaucratic nightmare that one has to go through to apply for these scholarships. 
The administration of this mobility funding should be targeted to individuals rather 
than to institutions granting such scholarships, so that students can vote with their 
feet.  Similarly, more funding in the FP should be allocated to individual researchers 
to cover their salaries.  This type of funding for researchers, when portable across 
institutions within the EU, will allow the researchers to vote with their feet and select 
the best institutions to pursue their research projects, thus instigating more EU wide 
competition by universities for research talent
11.    
                                                 
10  While the 7th FP, CIP and LLL& Erasmus represent 8.5% of the total EU budget 2007-2011,  the 
Structural Funds represent 35%. The Framework Programme Budget  (in total 48081 million Euro for 
2007-2011) is split into Cooperation (64%),  Ideas (incl ERC (15%),  People (Marie Curie Programme 
(9%), Capacities (Research infrastructures, SMEs, Regions of Knowledge, Research Potential, Science 
in society, International Cooperation), 8% and Joint Research Center 3%.   
11 The VICI scholarships awarded by the NWO are an example of a portable, individualized funding 
scheme within the Netherlands.  Its ambition to select each time the brightest of scholars and allow 






4.3.3.  EIB loans 
Finally, higher education is also a priority sector for the EIB and further expansion of 
its provision of income-contingent loans is desirable. Organizing income-contingent 
loans for education at EU level has the added advantage of offering more risk-
spreading opportunities and coordination on recovery ex post, when graduates are 
moving across EU and may be tempted not to pay back their loans. 
 
4.4.  Building capacity at EU scale and the use of flagships  
In a number of areas where critical mass needs to be built beyond the level of the 
individual Member State,  the EC should support the building of EU wide capacity.  A 
main priority should be European postgraduate/doctoral schools and networks of 
worldwide calibre in their dual function as the peak of higher education and the first 
career stage for researchers. The Commission should examine the possibility of 
providing more support to such schools and their students/researchers, provided they 
meet the subsidiarity criterion.  Specific support may be envisaged for joint or even 
‘European’ doctorates and quality assurance or accreditation at the doctoral level. The 
Marie-Curie programme for career development and mobility of researchers or the 
European University Institute in Florence already provides support at this level.  
In basic research, the European Research Council, will provide an arena for selecting 
bottom-up research projects and researchers on the basis of EU-wide excellence.   
When its reputation for selecting quality is established, it may serve as a flagship for 
national or regional selection bodies. 
The European Institute of Technology is another example of EU-wide scale building, 
with its ambition to develop in public-private partnership, a flagship in the knowledge 
triangle of education, research and innovation based on excellence, interdisciplinarity 
and networking between centres and between academia and business.  
 
4.5.  The EU as a facilitator of global cooperation  
The development of extensive cooperation, mobility and networks between European 
universities over the past decades has created the right conditions for broader 
internationalization. Most universities now have experience with multilateral 
consortia.  
Continuing globalization beyond the EU dimension,  means that the European Higher 
Education Area and the European Research Area must be fully open to the world.  
By launching the Erasmus Mundus programme the EU has started to promote 
mobility with third countries.  More structured international cooperation through 






worldwide, should be developed at EU level, supported by the necessary financial 
means.  
An important prerequisite for international ‘brain circulation’ is to simplify and 
accelerate legal and administrative procedures for the entry of non-EU students and 
researchers. Concerning admission and residence of third country researchers, the 
‘researchers’ visa’ package - a directive and two recommendations on the admission 
of third-country nationals to carry out scientific research in the European Community 
- was adopted in 2005 and will have to be transposed into national law during 2007.  
 
5.  SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Universities are key players in shaping the future of Europe. They are also key players 
in the successful transition to a knowledge-based economy and society. However, this 
crucial sector of the economy and of society needs in-depth restructuring and 
modernization if Europe is not to lose out in the global competition in education, 
research and innovation.  
Implementing this necessary restructuring and modernization requires coordinated 
action from all parties involved: 
•  Member States need to take the necessary measures with respect to universities, 
including aspects such as management, granting real autonomy and accountability 
to universities, funding mix and access to higher education. In particular, they 
should only subsidize courses whose social benefit exceed the private benefit and 
make much more resources available for fundamental research. Funding should be 
based less on inputs or outputs and more on academic excellence. They should also  
allow universities to charge must higher fees and to differentiate them by type of 
student and type of course. The Member States should in cooperation with the EIB 
provide student with income-contingent loans and cover default out of general 
funds. 
•  Universities, for their part, need to make strategic choices and conduct internal 
reforms to extend their funding base, attract the best students and faculty, enhance 
their areas of excellence and develop their competitive position. They should 
clearly state their mission and act accordingly. If their objective is to pursue 
academic excellence, they must aim to compete with the best universities 
elsewhere in the world. 
•  The Commission can contribute through improving the internal market for higher 
education, promoting policy dialogue and mutual learning, through financial 
support to Member States and to universities in their modernisation activities, to 
promote mobility of students and researchers. The Commission can also take the 
lead in developing Michelin guides for the best degree programmes according a 






market for higher education and to take action to demolish the power of 
monopolistic universities if it is used to the detriment of students. 
•  Last but not least, students should adopt a different mindset and choose the degree 
programme that best suits their needs. Clearly, this need not be the university 
closest to their family home and may well be a top university abroad. They also 
need to fund a greater part of their own education and thus be encouraged to 
demand the highest quality. 
Perhaps, the most important driving force for modernizing higher education in Europe 
emerges from competition. Increased competition, combined with more mobility and 
further concentration of resources, should enable universities to offer a more open and 
challenging environment to the most talented students and researchers, thereby 
making them more attractive to Europeans and non-Europeans alike. It is true that 
European universities on the whole are not in a good shape, but this also offers  huge 
opportunities to reap the benefits of reform.  
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